ABSTRACT. The increasing popularity of game modeling in international relations theory has fostered a tendency toward theoretical elegance to the detriment of empirical concerns. In this article attention is focused on the empirical implications of a series of choices that users of game theory must make when they model social interactions. In particular, possible tradeoffs between theoretical complexity and empirical robustness are evaluated. This is done both abstractly and with specific references to recent modeling efforts in the fields of security and international political economy.
Introduction
A common assertion in the study of international relations is that the choices of actors are interdependent. This interdependence leads to a strategic reasoning which becomes quite complex and unintelligible to the researcher, even for simple interactions. Game theory provides us with a comprehensive toolbox that allows indepth explorations of such interactions. Given the actors' basic preferences and their strategic environment, it helps us to infer how they rank the various policies at their disposal, and to determine the expected outcome(s) of the interplay of their policy choices. Aside from this predictive aim, game theory has a strong appeal for anyone engaged in explanation, investigation, or prescription. 1 It often makes intelligible processes that appear puzzling, this without attributing causality to factors such as the incompetence, irresponsibility, or lack of concern of decision-makers. For instance, the well-known security dilemma in Realism can be illuminated by the study of a prisoner's dilemma. And the use of games helps us understand the conditions of application of the famous "tying hands" principle in international negotiations.
Whatever its value, however, the use of game theory poses severe methodological problems that have prompted intense debates in the literature. 2 Critics have traditionally emphasized the over-stretching of the concept of rationality and the gap between abstract theoretical concepts and real phenomena. Regarding the notion of rationality, most solution concepts assume a very high computational ability from players who interact under conditions of imperfect information. To make their decisions, players must evaluate a host of possible worlds on the basis of the knowledge commonly shared with others or privately known. This kind of situation often implies that players engage in counterfactual reasoning about a large set of possible worlds. Leeway in their interpretation often leads to a myriad of possible equilibria which significantly lessens the predictive power of game theory. To avoid this indeterminacy-considered as unacceptable by most game theorists-rationality has been refined to allow the selection of one or very few equilibria among the vast initial array. Most of the refinements are ad hoc and lack empirical grounding.
A more recent controversy has focused on the empirical contribution of rational choice approaches to politics, including game-theoretic work. According to the most forceful critics (Green and Shapiro, 1994) , a variety of pathologies has prevented rational choice theory from improving our understanding of politics. In particular, rational choice theorists are, according to these critics, methoddriven rather than problem-driven. As a consequence, they neglect issues of empirical testing, which allegedly undermines the scientific value of rational choice theory.
Even though most rational choice theorists have long been aware of the weaknesses highlighted by their critics, they have in our opinion failed to shift debates from paradigmatic battles to serious discussions of methodological problems. 3 In this article, we wish to remedy this shortcoming and refocus attention on the empirical implications of a series of choices that users of game theory must make when they model social interactions. We discuss how these choices might influence the empirical relevance of game-theoretic work. In particular, we evaluate possible trade-offs between theoretical complexity and empirical robustness. On the one hand, the beauty of some complex models has beckoned a growing number of scholars and pushed them into baroque theory-building, which at times has clearly gone towards its rococo variety. On the other hand, theoretical elegance often remains devoid of any robust empirical reference. Our contribution here is not only critical but also intends to be constructive. We point to modeling choices that both alleviate theoretical baroqueness and enhance empirical robustness. As such, we hope to contribute to the improvement of a methodological tool that we consider of crucial importance to the study of international relations.
The first section of the article examines the modeling choices to be made before one gets to game theory as a tool. Standard game theory is only one among several possible approaches to the problem. In the second section, we address modeling choices within game theory. We discuss five basic constituents of what is called a game, and use them as criteria to assess the complexity of one's modeling choices. The third section examines the links between basic features of game models and their empirical robustness. We then turn in the fourth section to a discussion of some recent modeling efforts in international relations theory, in international security and international political economy, where we focus on the links between theoretical complexity and empirical robustness.
Game Theory Is but One Social Model
An unfortunate side-effect of the increasing popularity of game-theory among international relations scholars has been the neglect of the modeling primitives. Having a powerful modeling tool makes analysts sometimes forget that there are alternative ways to model social interactions than through game-theoretic constructs. This section goes back to basics to show that choosing game theory as a modeling tool entails implicit assumptions that we seek to bring forward explicitly.
At the ontological level, social scientists wish to model "variety in society." The first primitive is "variety," because we are interested in alternative states and developments. "Society," because our focus is on social phenomena. To theorize variety in society, we distinguish the following modeling categories, each stemming from a basic dichotomy. Concerning actors, one can envisage the social unit consisting of one individual or of more than one, that is, a group. In international relations research, it is common to model actors in a monolithic reductionist fashiontypically nation-states making choices on a similar basis as an individual. Alternatively, we could model international actors as a group, such as a "government-as-multiple actor" (Bendor and Hammond, 1992: 302) , as in an organizational or bureaucratic perspective.
Second, the choice procedure can be rational or not. Following Elster (1989: 13) , we can distinguish between rational decision-making in its numerous variants (including imperfectly rational decision-making procedures), and non-rational processes such as norm-based ones, or those stemming from emotions, for instance. 4 Third, how can society be conceived? It can be either individualistic, a sum of interacting units following a methodological individualistic line. Or, it can be holistic in nature, in a Durkheimian way for example. This follows Tönnies' classic distinction between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft.
Finally, we distinguish between choice procedures of a strategic nature, that is, with respect to a specific individual or group, and action against "Nature," that is, considering all other individuals' choices as given and not modified by one's own choices.
Most often, modelers envision human action in society as involving individual decision-makers who choose in a rational way, and who strategically take into account the behavior of other such rational individuals in an individualistic society. These modeling choices lead to only one family of models out of 16 possible ones: standard game theory envisioned as a social theory.
This typology, represented in Figure 1 , shows the extent to which standard game theory is but one modeling tradition among many. The typology pertains to basic choices one has to make when modeling action in society. If standard use of game theory corresponds to W1, one can envision other contexts where one could use it as a technique within other paradigmatic approaches, as can be seen in Table 1 .
Cell W1 includes rational decision-making of a monolithic (or individual decisionmaking) nature in a strategic perspective with respect to other such conceived individuals (i.e., within an individualistic society). If, for example, we vary one basic modeling feature only and postulate non-rationality (in W5), we get psychological or socio-psychological approaches such as cognitive or organizational decisionmaking. 5 From there, varying one dimension and having the decision-making as not strategic (W6), the non-rational choice procedure is with respect to "Nature," that is, to society envisioned as a given non-reactive feature of the decision-making Holistic Society environment-such as a basic attitude to life (pessimistic, risk-acceptant, shortterm vs. long-term orientation, etc.). If we now consider group decision-making (W14) with groupthink as an illustration of the kind of modeling done in this perspective, 6 the group does not make its decisions with respect to specific other actor(s), that is, strategically; decisions are against (one's own) nature. On the other hand, in W13 (strategic groupthink) where group thinking also tends towards nonrationality or even pathology of behavior, the group considers explicitly what others will do with respect to its behavior. Moving to cell W9, we have strategic rational group decision-making in an individualistic society. We illustrate it with principal-agent theory, which makes distinctions within a group. One could use gametheoretical approaches not only to portray decision-making within the group, but also to analyze the general decision-making between two groups interacting through two agents responding to their two principals.
Up to now, we have considered actors in an individualistic society. A holistic view implies at least that some feature of the individuals considered or the relation between those individuals results from the characteristics of this society. For example, actors' preferences are given by society, or there can be a holistic explanation of why some actors interact at all and others do not. More generally, in a holistic society, the nature of the actors and their decision-making itself are given and explained theoretically within that modeling approach. W16 represents the situation most unlike game theory: non-rational group decision-making without any strategic considerations, the decision-making being given by a holistic society, as in sociological determinism. On a similar basis, a shoal of fish following the ones in front of them who may sometimes respond to perceived potential dangers does so in a strategic manner (W15), but we remain within non-rational group decision- making within a holistic society. When in addition we have rational decision-making as in W11, for instance in a holistic society which molds its members into fullfledged cooperators, then we could use cooperative game theory to model the decision-making-both within and between groups. In W7, the modeling is of strategic individual non-rational choice in a holistic society, for instance predator-prey interaction where the focus is on the ecological equilibrium (holistic), which helps explain the non-rationality of individual decision-making.
This discussion of some examples of alternative ways of modeling puts game theory into perspective, as there are numerous ways of conceptualizing variety in society. While game theory can be used outside of W1 within some of the other perspectives-in a technical and not in a more substantive way-its use draws modelers towards W1, as we show in the last section of this article.
Constitutive Elements of a Game: Between Simplicity and Complexity
In addition to the neglect of primitives, users of game theory often fail to understand the implications of the choices of the basic elements of a game. In this section, we present a more specific array of possibilities within the confines of game theory. Given the kind of problems most scholars are interested in in international relations, we concentrate on non-cooperative games where players cannot make binding agreements.
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Our modeling typology is based on the constitutive elements of a game. We distinguish them according to the following criteria (5) solution concept. For the first four modeling criteria, we follow the standard way of defining a game. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944: 48-60) already conceptualize it along these lines, and modern treatments have followed. 9 The solution concept, the fifth criterion, is usually surmised in the technical discussion about how to solve the game. But it is just as essential as the other four when modeling choice in society, because the nature of the choice and therefore the nature of the actor making that choice is given by it. The whole concept of rationality central to game theory stems from it. As Güth (1990: 404) argues: "The most basic requirements for presenting and solving a game are closely interrelated with the notion of a player." Relegating solution concepts to the realm of game theory proper means letting technical solution concepts direct crucial features of game-theoretic modeling in an applied setting.
We emphasize that, from a conceptual-theoretical point of view, all five features are necessary to define a game. Therefore, the modeler should justify each modeling decision concerning each constitutive element in the light of the inevitable trade-offs between theoretical richness and manageability.
10 Likewise, for the empirical justification of theories, the operational implications of the model need to be specified in order to permit the necessary empirical link. Before discussing this latter question, let us examine the various ways in which one can model variety in society following these criteria.
Number of Players
Fewer than two players would not allow any strategic interaction. There is no upper limit: one can go up to n-players, with the n representing infinity. This is the classic distinction starting with Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) . In terms of complexity, a situation with two players is the simplest and then each additional player tends to increase the level of complexity. The passage from two to three players introduces the possibility of coalitions and thus greatly complicates the strategic calculus and its modelization.
Number of Actions
This criterion is two-dimensional. First, one can define the number of opportunities, from one to an unknown number n, to make a choice. Second, at each opportunity, or decision node in game-theoretic terms, a player may have a variable range of options to choose from. At each node, at least one alternative between two actions is needed, but there is no upper limit to the number of available options. In other words, we can have dichotomous choices up to a continuity of choices along a given interval at each decision node. A classic example of the latter is bargaining over the size of a pie, with each player being able to offer an infinite number of possible divisions. In connection with our discussion on complexity, the larger the number of choice opportunities and the number of options at each opportunity, the greater the complexity of a model. It is, however, unclear how we should rank models when the two dimensions of the number of actions do not co-vary. Indeed, there is no a priori reason to think that a model with one choice opportunity for any given player but with an infinite number of options is simpler than a model with an n number of dichotomous choices.
Measurement of Utilities
Classical measurement theory (Ellis, 1968: 58-67 ) distinguishes four common kinds of scales: "nominal," "ordinal," "linear intervals," and "ratio." While zero-sum games appear to imply a ratio-level of measurement of players' utilities, their mathematical properties are invariant to a linear transformation, and they are simply a specific case of constant-sum games. Overall, almost all work done is using an interval scale, though some basic game theory, especially the kind taught to beginning undergraduates, is of the ordinal sort (a nominal scale with the added property of an order with respect to some criterion, utility in this case).
Information Conditions
One can make different assumptions on the information players have when they make their decisions. With perfect information, players are fully aware of all the constituents of the interaction and of the previous moves. With imperfect information, game theorists distinguish between conditions of complete and incomplete information. Complete information refers to situations where players are fully aware of all the constituents of the game, but may not know previous moves. With incomplete information, players lack information about some constituent(s) of the interaction. This generally corresponds to situations where one or both of the following assumptions is not satisfied: (1) the players know both their strategies and those of the other players; (2) the players know their payoff functions and those of the other players. Uncertainty about these assumptions refers to what Harsanyi (1992) calls first-order uncertainty. Second-order uncertainty refers to the uncertainty regarding players' beliefs regarding the matters of first-order uncertainty. Both types of uncertainty can be addressed within a game-theoretic framework, through the transformation of incomplete information games into imperfect information games.
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Moving from perfect information to incomplete information greatly increases the complexity of the modeling exercise. In order to make it still mathematically manageable, analysts rely on a thorough description of the players' uncertainty. They reduce the unknown to a set of possible worlds, and assign specific probabilities to them. Moreover, players are assumed to have a shared perfect knowledge of the incompleteness of their information (about all the players in the interaction). "Limited information" is therefore a somewhat disingenuous term. While the scope of players' knowledge is indeed smaller, the required quality of this information is in fact higher within this mathematically restricted domain. To give an example, players may only partially know each others' preferences through the concept of several possible "types" of players. But they must assign beliefs to these different types, and these beliefs are usually modeled as common knowledge. This notion necessitates not only that players have a commonly shared identical knowledge of each others' beliefs, but in addition that players will similarly revise ("update") this knowledge.
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Solution Concept
Many solution concepts can be used to solve the games actors play. Choosing among them cannot be done independently from other modeling choices, especially from the information held by players. It is therefore difficult to evaluate the complexity of solution concepts per se. Those used for situations with incomplete information, such as sequential equilibria, tend to be more sophisticated than those used for situations where information is perfect, such as subgame perfection. One can, however, distinguish solution concepts among the rationality requirements required from players in order to pick an optimal strategy. In this vein, choosing between the seminal Nash equilibrium and the host of refinements that have been developed since Nash implies different degrees of rationality from actors.
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Refinements can be classified according to the assumed players' counterfactual reasoning ability, and according to the consistency criteria regarding information processing. Moreover, one can posit refinements of refinements which, of course, tend to be more demanding. For instance, the sequential equilibrium which is a refinement of the notion of subgame perfection-itself a refinement of the Nash equilibrium-puts much more detailed constraints on decision-makers' behavior. But as in the case of information conditions, a similar path of mathematical expediency is followed: the difference between refinements is not justified on theoretical grounds-and even less on empirical ones-but is technical, using simplistic assumptions to keep the derivation mathematically tractable (for example, common knowledge of prior beliefs in a sequential equilibrium; size of tremble in a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium). We share Binmore's (1992: 13) view that "most of the literature on 'refinements of Nash equilibrium' belongs on the same shelf with the works of medieval scholastics."
Aggregating Modeling Choices: Between Simple and Complex Games
Multiple modeling decisions need to be taken for all five constituents of a game. How can one characterize these modeling choices, and how simple, or complex, should one's model be? Savage (1954) , for example, pleads for his small world view whereby there is a "practical necessity of confining attention to, or isolating relatively simple situations" (pp. 82-83) in the context of one-person decisions. Otherwise, he argues, every decision-maker would have to consider all the possible implications of his decision, a logic that leads to the extreme situation where each individual makes one decision only, once for all-clearly an impractical viewpoint. Aumann (1989: 15 ) extends Savage's point to game theory and also pleads for simplicity in the modeling. It is in this spirit that we use the above-mentioned criteria to help assess the complexity of a model piece by piece. Given the orthogonality of the choices, however, we can only identify classes of complexity with much leeway in the ranking between models. We therefore warn many modelers, on the theoretical ground, not to rush too quickly to conclusions about the relative complexity of their models. One should keep in mind that there is much overlap between small worlds, and it is rarely clear which one is closer to the grand world. Figure 2 illustrates our point by restricting attention (due to the three-dimensional limitation of the figure) to three of our five dimensions of differentiation-the number of players, the number of actions, and the distribution of information among players. 14 To locate simplicity and complexity in Figure 2 , let us consider that the number of players varies from two to n, the number of actions (along its two dimensions) from two to n, and the distribution of information from perfect to n-sided incomplete with an infinity of types. From these assumptions, the simplest models are those close to point A, whereas the most complex are located in the vicinity of point G, for instance in the prism (F,FЈ,G,GЈ,H,HЈ).
From Theory to Empirical Evidence: Modeling Choices and Empirical Robustness
The next step in our argument is to link issues of theoretical complexity to empirical concerns. To do so, we introduce in this section the concept of empirical robustness as a way to assess the empirical relevance of game-theoretic work. We then discuss how different modeling choices in terms of players, actions, utilities, information, and solution concepts might influence the empirical robustness of gametheoretic models of international relations. Robustness is the opposite of sensitivity. We wish to have models whose implications are not sensitive to limited changes in basic assumptions and standard parametric values: "robustness signifies insensitivity to small deviations from the assumptions" (Huber, 1981: 1) . This definition from a classic work in statistics refers to the validation of statistical models on the basis of empirical observations. If a small deviation in a sample will bring about a large change in the estimation of the underlying distribution, for example, then what confidence can one have in the estimation? We wish to be sure that measurement errors will not lead us to accept a fairly different model from the real underlying one. This problem has been known for a long time, and the standard statistical answer to it was to clean the data by rejecting the outliers, following different kinds of rules, and then using classical estimation theory. However, it is not clear what an outlier is, since we do not know the true model precisely.
Robust statistics are not to be confused with non-parametric methods; they are, rather, parametric in nature. They help us account for data in cases where the underlying parametric model is not literally true. In other words, robust procedures give us greater confidence that the underlying model is qualitatively a good one, as robust estimates are "consistent estimates of the unknown parameters at the idealized model. Because of robustness they will not drift too far away if the model is only approximately true" (Huber, 1981: 6) . As another, more recent, classic work notes:
Robust statistics, in a loose, nontechnical sense, is concerned with the fact that many assumptions commonly made in statistics . . . are at most approximations to reality. One reason is the occurrence of gross errors . . . [which] usually show up as outliers. . . . Other reasons for deviations from idealized model assumptions include the empirical character of many models and the approximate character of many theoretical models. . . . [T] he problem with the theories of classical parametric statistics (be they frequentist or Bayesian) is that they derive optimal procedures under exact parametric models, but say nothing about their behavior when the models are only approximately valid. Neither does nonparametric statistics specifically address this situation (Hampel et al., 1986: 1) . This is precisely the spirit in which we wish to consider existing models of international relations phenomena. First, are our models sufficiently robust with respect to reasonable deviations from idealized conditions? A large sensitivity in the theoretical results with respect to some small parametric assumptions will strongly undermine confidence in the model. Second, does the available evidence help us sufficiently to discriminate between several different models of the same phenomenon? Our discussion is therefore of a theoretical-modeling nature, as well as of an empirical nature. 15 We proceed using the five modeling criteria presented in the previous section.
Robustness and the Number of Actors
The implications of greater theoretical complexity are clear with respect to this first modeling choice. Whereas there can be legitimate discussions about the number of involved actors in a specific situation, there is no controversy about the fact that a variation in the number of actors has daunting effects on the sensitivity of the construct. Determining the number of significant actors clearly is a modeling decision which needs to be defended by appealing to diverse arguments of an empirical nature bolstering a specific modeling claim. 16 
Robustness and the Number of Actions
Any detailed historical account of an important strategic interaction situation shows that both sides interact extensively in words and deeds, often not waiting to witness the full reaction of the other party(ies) in the interaction. Instead, they proceed with various moves and counter-moves in reaction to some-but not necessarily all-previous moves by the other(s). In addition, their perception of the situation can be quite at variance with other parties' perceptions. Events data research has shown that there is a strong correlation between conflictual and cooperative events during an international crisis, some scholars going so far as to make this correlation a defining element in a crisis. Thus, from a modeling standpoint, the link between theoretical constructions and empirical robustness is an intriguing one.
Modeling decisions about the number of choice opportunities are particularly problematic, because they generally force the analyst to make assumptions about the timing of decisions. When players have several opportunities to make a decision, the model generally specifies a well-established sequence of play, and any change in this sequence generally has a significant impact on the outcome of the interaction. Whereas there is no doubt that real decisions tend to be sequential, moves and counter-moves by actors rarely follow a similar sequence. In one case, a given action may precede another one, whereas in another case, it may follow or not even be present. The more detailed the description, the more idiosyncratic and the less robust the model. Another problem raised by a sequential approach lies in the important data requirements which will preclude most researchers from having sufficient information to conclusively validate a specific model.
Only for historically much-analyzed events such as the Cuban missile crisis do we have some of the necessary data to meaningfully submit complex sequential game models to test. But, even in such a case, there is a lack of consensus on some basic features of the crisis. Even if John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev were still alive with perfect memory and made themselves fully available to the scholarly community, a consensus would probably not be reached on some crucial questions. For example, determining which information was important at what specific step for all the steps envisaged by a researcher would still escape us to some extent.
From the above discussion one might be tempted to conclude that concern for empirical robustness should detract modelers from rococo constructions and instead force soberness. Any model should focus on key strategic elements present in the events under study, and this can generally be done within simple constructs. 17 We do not argue, however, that the simpler the better. In other words, we do not claim that concern with empirical robustness always puts a premium on one-shot simultaneous-move game models that do not require a knowledge of a specific sequence. Whereas we agree that these games might well prove appropriate in some situations, they also often fail to reflect some key elements of international interactions. From this perspective, robustness would simply apply to their failure to predict or explain phenomena.
Robustness and the Measurement of Utilities
From the start, that is, since Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) , game theory has been built on the basis of expected utility, which allows one to get interesting theoretical results. This has not changed: Fudenberg and Tirole (1991: 4) , in their well-known advanced manual on game theory, define among the basic constituents of a game in strategic form "payoff functions U i that give player i's von NeumannMorgenstern utility U i (s) for each profile s = (s 1 , . . . ,s I ) of strategies.
18 However, as anyone who introduces game theory to undergraduates knows, one can explore some very interesting and fundamental features of game theory with the help of simple ordinal 2 ϫ 2 simultaneous games in conditions of complete information.
We are not arguing that making strong assumptions is unwarranted and unjustified. Any theory needs to make some basic postulates about the world, if only to delimit its domain within it. Do international relations modelers use a cardinal interval level of measurement for the preferences because they believe the world out there is cardinal-even when our measurements cannot be as fine-grained? Or have they followed the path of mathematical expediency? As we show below, the path has often been one of mathematical convenience.
From an empirical standpoint, it appears to us that it is difficult enough in international relations to discriminate between some basic outcomes such as a negotiated compromise and one party winning. Ordinal preferences are sufficiently rough to cover such basic categories. On the other hand, the requirements for a measurement of interval-scale events at the empirical level clearly appear quite demanding. For example, there is still a vigorous debate about whether the Cuban missile crisis-probably not the least studied international event-resulted in a victory for the United States or ended in a compromise of sorts. Clearly, there was no war; but whether the Soviet Union was not a victor is less clear. The point we wish to make here is that a cardinal level of measurement is much more demanding for many phenomena in international relations than is commonly realized.
Robustness and Information Conditions
In our discussion on the number of actions, we pointed to the strength of some assumptions regarding information conditions when the players do not have full information about the parameters of the interaction. Here we want to address the empirical sensitivity of these assumptions. Modelers distinguish between different "types" of players, that is between players with different payoff structures, and they assign prior probability distributions to the variety of types. These starting choices strongly influence the unfolding of the game, and thus their empirical robustness appears to be a must. However, the very specificity of the information implied by the distinction between several types of actors makes it very sensitive to any change in the real distribution of information. To be more explicit, modelers often assume that a player can take an infinite number of types uniformly distributed over a bounded interval. To our knowledge no one has tried to explore the consequences of slight perturbations in the form of the distribution function, but it can be reasonably inferred from cases with two or three types that small variations in the prior probabilities may have significant consequences. Robustness is thus highly doubtful, even if we cannot give a definite answer at that point.
A related aspect, that of the information players have about what we called the incompleteness of information, also raises vexing questions. In particular, do players know that the other(s) have incomplete information, and if they do how much do they know? The standard attitude has been to assume that information about players' beliefs is common knowledge, that is, everyone knows the prior probabilities of each other, who knows that each other knows, and so on ad infinitum. This choice has often been considered "heroic," but our concern here is related to the implications of having slightly less than common knowledge in a given game. For simple settings relying on solution concepts such as dominant strategies, rationalizability, or Nash equilibria, some recent studies show that common knowledge conditions can be relaxed for most of the parameters of the game without altering the predictions. 19 But when more sophisticated concepts are used, in particular under incomplete information conditions, relaxing common knowledge leads to indeterminacy, and radically changes the predictions of a game. This is a serious problem given the difficulty of witnessing the condition of common knowledge, since this concept is not observable.
Finally, turning to the issue of the commonly used Bayesian learning mechanism used in game theory, the following quote from a classic in robust statistics is quite revealing:
Bayesians are confronted with the same problem as frequentists, namely that their parametric models (of which they make strong use) are only approximately valid. Apart from the desideratum of stable inference under small changes of the parametric model, they have the additional problem of stability under small changes of the prior distribution. . . . Only the extreme omniscient Bayesians who can put a quantitative prior probability distribution on everything will also put a prior on all possible deviations from the parametric model and then "integrate it out" without any formal need for stability considerations or model criticism (Hampel et al., 1986: 53) .
Robustness and Solution Concepts
How should we envision the notion of empirical robustness with respect to the solution concept used for deriving predictions? Slight differences in the strategic computations of actors should not lead to significantly different predictions. And so solution concepts which are based on the same kind of reasoning should not lead to sharp differences. However, this is typically not the case. Let us consider the following three central and closely related solutions concepts: trembling-hand perfection (Selten, 1975) , properness (Myerson, 1978) , and strict perfection (Okada, 1981) . These three concepts aim to rule out equilibria that are too sensitive to mistakes, or "trembles," by players. Put into the context of a specific situation, the three concepts require players to engage in counterfactual reasoning about what would happen if the other makes a mistake and thus deviates from his expected behavior.
The difference between the three concepts is that counterfactual analysis is gradually more codified when moving from trembling-hand perfection to properness and then from properness to strict perfection. Trembling-hand perfection, often referred to as perfection, is the least demanding of the three. The basic idea behind perfection is to rule out unreasonable equilibria by assuming that actors acknowledge some possible mistakes by the other one. In contrast, strict perfection is the most demanding of the three concepts. It assumes that a strategy pair must be robust against all possible mistakes. Properness is less demanding than strict perfection because it does not consider all possible mistakes. However, it is more demanding than perfection because it restricts the arbitrary specification (reflected in the term some) of trembles. More specifically, the probability of mistakes should reflect their relative costs to players who make them.
From this perspective, we should expect a gradual reduction of the set of solutions as we increase the demands from perfection to properness and from properness to strict perfection. This, however, is not the case, as is illustrated by one specific example due to Bicchieri (1993: 76) .
In the game depicted in Table 2 , both (U,A) and (D,A) are perfect equilibria. For the sake of the argument, we focus on strategy pair (U,A), but a similar reasoning applies to strategy pair (D,A). From player Row's perspective, choosing strategy U remains an optimal response when player Column specifically trembles onto strategy B. From player Column's perspective, choosing A remains optimal if player Row trembles toward strategy D. Strategy pairs (U,A) and (D,A) are also proper equilibria. Keeping our focus on (U,A), player Column can only consider one possible mistake by player Row and thus there is no change from the above reasoning. Turning to player Row's perspective, he has to consider trembles by player Column onto strategy B and strategy C. Given that both mistakes are equally costly for player Column (reducing the payoff from unity to zero), player Row can logically consider them as equally likely, which implies that strategy A remains optimal. Applying strict perfection gives a different picture. Consider again strategy pair (U,A). If player Column trembles more onto C than B, player Row should respond with strategy D, rather than strategy A. As a result, (U,A) is not a strictly perfect equilibrium. A similar reasoning also rules out strategy pair (D,A) as a possible strictly perfect equilibrium. In sum, moving up the ladder of restriction produces very different effects. The first step does not bring any change, whereas the second step eliminates all the equilibria. A slight variation in the solution concept brings abrupt changes, which hardly meets our criterion of robustness.
This problem becomes more acute as games gain in complexity. The reason is that whereas one can still forego using refinements in situations like the one we depicted in Table 2 , this becomes impossible-unless one is willing to accept general indeterminacy-in situations of incomplete information and a multiplicity of actions and possible players. In such situations, variation in the use of refinements can bring even more spectacular results, thus reflecting a serious lack of robustness. There can be no doubt that the question of solution concepts is at a minimum at a baroque stage, but more likely a long way into its rococo phase.
What can we conclude from this section on the links between theoretical complexity and empirical robustness? First, it seems unlikely that models located in the prism (F,FЈ,G,GЈ,H,HЈ) in Figure 2 would exhibit empirical robustness. This would primarily, but not only, stem from the baroqueness of solution concepts that are needed to resolve such games. Second, the relation between empirical robustness and complexity is not monotonic. Simpler models may fail to represent key strategic elements of a class of given interactions and thus might only be robust in their inability to predict, explain, or describe these processes. Third, a true concern with robustness argues in favor of modeling pluralism rather than uniformity, provided diversity remains limited to essential lines of the models.
International Relations Theory and Game Theory: Where Do We Stand?
We now consider a selection of some of the recent game-theoretical work done in international relations theory. We aim to highlight the problems discussed abstractly until now, and point to the attitudes of modelers toward these issues. In particular, we try to see whether the level of theoretical complexity influences how scholars care about empirical issues, how they deal with them, and whether we can conclude that their models exhibit robustness. Our selection focuses on work belonging to two important sub-fields in the literature. The first one comprises models in the field of security. The second one includes work in the field of international political economy. For each sub-set, we first discuss the issue of theoretical complexity in connection with our three-dimensional measurement depicted in Figure 2 . We then consider the empirical concern of various authors, which helps us establish a link between complexity and robustness. Our use of sub-sets of comparable work allows us to go beyond an individual review of robustness. The idea is that if different modeling choices lead to similar theoretical results, we should expect some robustness. 20 Finally, as a guide to future game modeling in international relations theory, we highlight how the most careful work deals with the modeling choices presented in previous sections. We complement this discussion with developments in our own work.
Crisis Decision-making
Game modeling has flourished in the field of security studies since the mid-80s. 21 We selected a sub-set of this growing literature to discuss potential trade-offs between theoretical complexity and empirical robustness. Specifically, we look at work focusing on crisis decision-making. This work addresses several fundamental questions about international conflict, such as the conditions for successful deterrence, and the links between power distribution and the likelihood of escalation. Because of space limitations, we do not offer an exhaustive view of this sub-domain, 22 but rather what we contend is a fairly representative sample that reflects both the general trend and the modeling diversity. Table 3 lists our sample and summarizes the features of the studies along the three criteria depicted in Figure 2 -number of players, number of actions, and information conditions.
As Table 3 makes clear, most studies in our selection analyze interactions between two players and are thus located in the vertical plane ADHE in Figure 2 . Moreover, most of them assume that players have incomplete information. From these two dimensions, the book-length study by Niou, Ordeshook, and Rose (1989) is a clear outlier. It not only considers three or more actors but also relies on complete information. The other study that is somewhat outside the main trend is the one by Brams (1994) due to its assumption of complete information. All the other contributions are more closely related and form a more compact sub-set. Interestingly enough, this first observation is not sensitive to an enlargement of our sample. The vast majority of this literature tends to focus on situations with two players with limited information. The compactness of the sample inside vertical plane ADHE tends to indicate that most studies are comparable in terms of complexity. We can, however, single out Powell's (1990 Powell's ( , 1996 work given its greater complexity along the action dimension. In Figure 2 , this work tends toward point H, and thus we would classify it as being the most baroque.
Can we link these brief observations on modeling choices and complexity with empirical performance? From an empirical testing perspective, the sample includes two clearly delimited groups of work. One of them (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow and Zorrick, 1997; Fearon, 1994b) explicitly and rigorously engages in finding empirical support, while the other provides at best some illustrative evidence.
In terms of the composition of these two classes, we find support for our discussion in the previous section. First, the most complex modeling constructs (Powell, 1990 (Powell, , 1996 neglect empirical testing, prompting the suspicion that they are not empirically robust. The author justifies his position with the "few cases" argument, and remains very skeptical toward testing. Given the difficulty of assessing such concepts as states' beliefs and payoffs, measurement, in his opinion, will remain elusive. Hence Powell (1990: 185) admits that "the models and analysis presented in the preceding chapters are, at best, sources of insight into the dynamics of nuclear confrontation." More generally, on this first point, no model with an infinite array of possible decisions on any of the two dimensions of actions (opportunities and alternatives) comes with empirical support. Given the diversity of studies along the other modeling dimensions, there is some reason to think that the choice of infinite actions is a key manifestation of baroqueness.
Second, analysts who make simpler modeling choices are not necessarily more concerned with empirical testing. According to our measurement tool, Kydd's (1997) model is simpler than the one developed by Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, 38 International Political Science Review 20(1) Powell (1996) 2 n (n) Two-sided incomplete with continuous types and Zorrick (1997), but the former does not offer any empirical support whereas the latter does. Third, whereas the empirically most careful work models interactions between two actors, other work in this category tends to indicate that there is no intrinsic empirical advantage in making this modeling choice. We cannot prove that diversity helps to build empirically robust models, but there is no evidence either that it does not. We therefore wish to encourage more work outside the vertical plane ADHE (see Figure 2) .
Until now we have inferred some general assessments by looking at the different pieces of work individually. One might argue, however, that whereas some of the analysts do not evaluate their theoretical propositions, consistency with the results of other analysts would suggest some robustness. Before briefly considering this argument here, we first observe that analysts themselves often do not pay particular attention to it. Most of the studies make only limited references to the results of others, and there tends to be a correlation between those who do so and those who also offer a careful individual empirical assessment of their models (see in particular Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992, and Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorrick, 1997) . But let us now consider the positions of a sub-set of these studies on the question of the distribution of power and the likelihood of war.
24 More specifically, does the distribution of power affect the likelihood of war and if so how? Clearly there is no consensus on this question. For instance, whereas both Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) and Powell (1996) find that distribution of power matters, they disagree on the detailed influence. The former find that uneven distributions of power reduce the likelihood of war independently from the players' dissatisfaction with the status quo. The latter finds that the likelihood of war is a function of both the distribution of power and the degree of satisfaction with the status quo: the smaller the disparity between power distribution and the status quo distribution of benefits, the less the probability of war. This means that high power disparity can be conducive to instability. This conclusion contradicts Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), a study with empirical support, but also the outlying work by Niou, Ordeshook, and Rose (1989) . While we could extend this discussion further, suffice it to conclude that we cannot gain insight on the robustness of one of the most baroque studies on the basis of a theoretical comparison with other work.
To move toward a prescriptive task, we now highlight the testing procedure used by two of the three pieces of work that do provide empirical support, that is, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) and Fearon (1994b) . The former use two different methods to evaluate theoretical results stated in two different forms. First, they use statistical analysis-mostly bivariate logit analysis-to test a series of general hypotheses on the behavior of actors. This serves as a check on the general validity of the basic features of the model. Second, they engage in case study analysis of selected historical events to assess the empirical relevance of game equilibria that describe precisely the expected behavior of players. This second stage highlights the internal validity and richness of the model. Moreover, as we noted above, they contrast their results to those of other models in the same realm. The combination of these different procedures significantly bolsters the empirical credibility of the model. Going back to our discussion of complexity, it is worth noting, however, that they do not evaluate results of the model under incomplete information. Although later collective work by one of the co-authors (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorrick, 1997) remedies this weakness, this model supports the idea of a trade-off between complexity and empirical robustness.
Turning to the work by Fearon (1994b) , testing is mostly indirect through the statistical analysis of a set of hypotheses derived from the parameters of the game, in particular the influence of information updating on the probability of success of immediate and general deterrence. Fearon's treatment is suggestive of how the problem of empirical testing should be addressed for large-N data sets. His empirical test consists in showing that decision-makers do make inferences about the kind of opponent they are facing, and change their behavior accordingly. Even if he does not engage in specific, case study analysis, his analysis is strengthened by the comparison with alternative work that uses case study methods and does not rely on game-theoretic strategic computations.
Our aim here is not simply to applaud these efforts but also to draw upon our own work to suggest ways that can even improve them. First, contrast or comparison with other existing studies should be done both for similar (as in Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992) and alternative formal constructs (as in Fearon, 1994b ). Our prior work shows that this greatly helps to highlight the empirical value of one's approach. 25 Second, when using case study analysis, modelers should be more careful before rushing to a cardinal measurement of utilities.
26 Some of our prior work points to the usefulness of working with ordinal scales, in particular when one wishes to evaluate the sensitivity of coding procedures. These prescriptions will surely be more fruitful than isolated attempts to "invent" new theoretical concepts that could alleviate the problem of empirical testing. As a case in point, Brams's (1994: 26) notion of a nonmyopic equilibrium hardly improves the empirical robustness of his construct.
Institutions, Domestic Politics and Bargaining on Politico-economic Issues
Game modeling is both a more recent and more limited development in the field of international political economy than in the security domain. We focus here on the issue that has received the most attention, that is, the interactions between international and domestic affairs on issues of trade, exchange rate, and debt.
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Major research questions revolve around the influence of diverse domestic politicoinstitutional factors (types of domestic institutions, divisions between government, legislature, and interest groups; position of the median voter; election cycles) on states' negotiation behavior, and on ratification chances of international agreements. Our sample of studies listed in Table 4 includes some of the most recent 40 International Political Science Review 20(1) Mo (1995) 3 3 (n,2) One-sided incomplete with continuous types Pahre (1997) 3 or 4 up to 8 (2) Complete developments and reflects the diversity of approaches that has characterized the domain. It purports to be fairly representative. In contrast to our selection on crisis bargaining, there is more diversity in the location of the different studies in the three-dimensional space of Figure 2 . Two pieces, Aggarwal (1996) and Iida (1993) , belong to the vertical plane ADHE. Among the others, two- Lohmann (1997) and Pahre (1997) -are located on the horizontal plane ABCD, and the remaining three are positioned in the cubic space between the horizontal plane ABCD and prism (F,FЈ,G,GЈ,H,HЈ) . Given this constellation, first, there exists no clear-cut outlier, and second, ranking studies in terms of complexity is difficult with our rough measurement tool. That being said, the book-length study by Aggarwal (1996) clearly makes modeling choices that are overall simpler than all the other pieces. In Figure 2 , this work would be located in the neighborhood of point A on the line segment (A,D). At the other end of the scale of complexity, the models of Iida (1993) , Mo (1995 ), Milner (1997 , and Milner and Rosendorff (1997) tend toward prism (F,FЈ,G,GЈ,H,HЈ), defined as the location of highest complexity in our discussion of modeling choices.
Can we link these brief observations on modeling choices and complexity with empirical performance? As in the case of crisis bargaining, there is stark contrast between studies of those who engage in empirical testing (Aggarwal, 1996; Milner, 1997;  and to a lesser extent Pahre, 1997) and those who do not. Regarding the modeling choices inside these two groups, we find support for our discussion in the previous section.
First, three out of the four most complex modeling constructs (Iida, 1993; Mo, 1995; and Milner and Rosendorff, 1997 ) neglect empirical testing. More generally, no model that allows for an n number of opportunities of action and assumes limited information for more than one player has been tested.
We also find some support for our second point, the non-monotonicity of the relation between complexity and empirical robustness. Getting closer to the prism (F,FЈ,G,GЈ,H,HЈ) does not necessarily imply less concern with empirical testing. Whereas Milner (1997) offers empirical support, Lohmann (1997) does not. However, the simpler study (Aggarwal, 1996) offers the most convincing empirical treatment.
Third, this sample confirms that very diverse modeling choices can be compatible with empirical testing. Choices should therefore not be method-driven but rather made in connection with the core empirical concern. Additional theoretical richness does not translate in additional empirical insights, far from it. For instance, one of the key differences between the models developed in Milner (1997) and Milner and Rosendorff (1997) is the scope of limited information-restricted to one actor in the former case and extended to two actors in the latter. Whereas this brings some additional theoretical richness, there is no indication what the empirical relevance is or could be.
Turning to the argument of theoretical robustness across the various studies, we focus on two generalizations from this set of models. None of them allows us to bolster our confidence in the robustness of work without empirical testing. The first issue pertains to the relationships between the salience of domestic politics and the prospect of international cooperation, or international agreement. Using complete information, both Aggarwal (1996) and Lohmann (1997) have different results. In most of the situations studied by the former, high salience of domestic politics hurts international agreement, as expected by the model. In contrast, Lohmann's theoretical analysis shows that domestic politics sometimes helps international cooperation by introducing linkage options. Among studies using incomplete information, there is a clear consensus on the negative influence of salient domestic politics when information is limited, but with no uniformity in the questions of how much and when.
The second generalization concerns Schelling's (1960) conjecture that tying hands at home gives a government bargaining leverage at the international level. While all the contributions show the contingent nature of this conjecture, they disagree on the key determinants of the contingency. To give a few examples, in Aggarwal's (1996) work, power distribution between actors at the international level largely delimits the windows of applicability of the conjecture. For Lohmann (1997) , the actors' shadow of the future is crucial. And finally, information distribution and the extent of government division are central in Milner (1997) and Milner and Rosendorff (1997) .
From a prescriptive viewpoint, we now briefly discuss the testing procedures of the two most empirically elaborate, and sharply different, pieces of work- Aggarwal (1996) and Milner (1997) . The former offers a direct way to confront theoretical predictions and real world phenomena. The key is an operationalizable utility function, based on players' goals and individual situations defined in terms of resources and domestic coalitional constraints. Aggarwal's approach consists of a formal method to derive payoffs for actors based on their basic goals and their individual situations. Using a set of coding rules, he systematically tests the prediction of his model through a case study analysis of 61 historical episodes. Given the high rate of match between theoretical and real outcomes for these cases, one gets a strong impression of robustness. There is one key element that we wish to emphasize with respect to this procedure. Direct testing of game models relies on a set of simplifying assumptions, acknowledged as such by the author. In particular, players choose among three discrete options, and with complete information. Both decisions help build an operationalizable utility function assorted of a set of coding rules. Aggarwal clearly favors empirical robustness over theoretical elegance and we find this attitude quite refreshing. Milner's (1997) procedure also relies on case study analyses but testing is indirect. Based on the theoretical implications of her models, she derives a set of testable hypotheses that are systematically examined through eight case studies. The interesting feature of the procedure is that the author somehow tries to find a middle way between an assessment of the general validity of the model (normally done through statistical analysis) and its richness in specific cases. She clearly skews her analysis in favor of the first goal, however, by giving only a cursory treatment of the different cases and neglecting decisional inferences by individual decision-makers.
To conclude our discussion on this second sample of scholarship, we wish to make a few suggestions for development based on our own work. First, contrast or comparison with other work should be performed more systematically even if one relies on case studies. 28 This approach helps to illuminate modeling trade-offs and to justify them. Second, when using case study analysis, modelers should be more careful before rushing to a cardinal measurement of utilities. Some of our prior work points to the usefulness of working with ordinal scales, in particular when one wishes to evaluate the sensitivity of the coding procedures.
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Conclusion
Using game theory as a social model requires several modeling choices. Although this is hardly novel, many modelers have tended to neglect the empirical implica-tions of these choices. This article has refocused attention on this issue and discussed possible trade-offs between theoretical complexity, defined by the modeling choices, and empirical robustness.
We have reached the following conclusions based both on a technical discussion of modeling primitives as well as on evaluation of recent work in two important subfields of international relations theory. First, highest modeling complexity has no empirical robustness. Second, the relationship between empirical robustness and complexity is not necessarily monotonic and some middle ground is sometimes most useful. Third, a true concern with robustness argues in favor of modeling pluralism rather than uniformity, provided diversity remains limited to essential lines of the models. In sum, there are venues for rigorous theoretical work that lends itself to empirical challenge, without necessarily going into baroque or even rococo modeling.
When modeling international relations phenomena, one should constantly have the idea of robustness in mind. Theoretical robustness is important: our models should endure reasonable deviations from their assumptions without exhibiting qualitatively very different results. But empirical robustness is even more crucial: we need empirical data that can help us discriminate among alternative models. In fact, our models should be built in such a way that the little empirical data that is available can be used to discriminate among them.
Notes
10. See Aggarwal and Dupont (1992) for an examination of this trade-off issue. 11. The so-called Harsanyi's transformation permits us to deal with incomplete information.
Games with incomplete information are reduced to game-theoretical equivalent games fully accessible to game-theoretic analysis through the use of probabilistic models. For the original treatment see Harsanyi (1967/68) , and for a rather non-technical presentation of the method see Harsanyi (1992) . 12. For a technical discussion of common knowledge, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991: chap. 14). 13. "A refinement of Nash equilibrium is a solution concept that is intended to offer a more accurate characterization of rational intelligent behavior in games [...] A selection criterion is then any objective standard, defined in terms of the given structure of the mathematical game, that can be used to determine the focal equilibrium that everyone expects" (Myerson, 1991: 241) . 14. Regarding the other two dimensions, complexity for the solution concept tends to co-vary with information conditions (for technical reasons). We discuss measurement of utilities separately. 15. As Oskar Morgenstern puts it: "It is worth emphasizing that as great a mathematician as J. von Neumann never tired of repeating the fact that the errors of observation are what really matter. This is entirely in the spirit of Gauss" (Morgenstern, 1950: 108) . 16. Some authors, however, use theoretical arguments to determine the number of actors.
For example, Marx argued that contradictions in society would lead to an ultimate clash between two classes only-the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in capitalism. Following Adam Smith, the concept of a market under perfect competition theoretically posits a very large if not infinite number of actors. 17. We therefore argue for a more structural approach instead of a purely phenomenological one. In that sense, as McGinnis (1992) argues, there are more commonalities between the cognitively-oriented scholars of international crises and sequential game modelers than both care to admit. 18. See also Kreps (1990a; 363, 370-371) . 19. For more on this, see for instance Brandenburger (1992) , or Bicchieri (1993) . 20. This procedure cannot, however, replace an empirical assessment of the robustness of individual models. 21. The seminal piece was Nalebuff (1986) . 22. Other work includes, for instance, Banks (1990); Carlson (1996); Fearon (1994a) ; Zagare (1991, 1993) ; Kim and Bueno de Mesquita (1995); and Morrow (1989) . 23. The first figure in the column indicates the number of choice opportunities and the bracketed figure refers to the number of alternatives. 24. Given the specificity of the models, it is impossible to find a research question that is addressed by all studies. We therefore chose to discuss among the fundamental questions the one that receives the largest treatment. 25. Dupont (1994) . 26. Aggarwal and Allan (1992, 1994) . 27. This literature is a subset of the work on domestic-international linkages, which include studies in the field of security. See for instance Fearon (1997) and Papayoanou (1997) . 28. Dupont (1994) . 29. Aggarwal and Allan (1992, 1994) .
